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Colliding Discourses: 
 The (Impossible?) Art of Persuasion in Afghanistan 
Andrew D. Belyea 
 
It is a fundamental mistake to see the enemy as a set of targets. 
The enemy in war is a group of people. 
Some of them will have to be killed. 
Others will have to be captured or driven into hiding. 
The overwhelming majority, however, have to be persuaded.
1
 
    —Frederick Kagan 
 
During two Afghanistan deployments, to Kandahar and later Kabul, between 
November 2009 and September 2011, I was employed in a part of the world of 
warcraft known in military circles as non-kinetic influence activities: activities 
undertaken to change minds, and hopefully actions, without relying on bullets 
and bombs. I want to explore briefly here my ten-month deployment to Kandahar 
in 2009-10, and what I hope will make it interesting to readers is how I 
experienced war through two radically different lenses. The first was as a 
military man with twenty-seven years of service, including ten as a non-
commissioned Avionics Technician and the remainder as an Air Force Logistics 
Officer. The second was as an English Literature professor to no small degree 
influenced by the postmodern celebration of difference, ambiguity, and 
uncertainty.  
You really couldn’t ask for a more incongruent fusion of personas. The first 
lens is likely very familiar, even to those who haven’t served in the military. We 
all know, for instance, how militaries seek to minimize ambiguity and maximize 
certainty, and how they operate in the realm of tangible goals and concrete 
objectives. They are grounded in discipline, organization, and structure; they 
break complex tasks down to specialized, manageable bits; and they view 
individuals—despite recognizing them as the critical lowest common 
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denominator—as relatively insignificant in the context of the whole. There is a 
reason that soldiers so often colloquially refer to a “military machine”: it is more 
powerful than us, can chew us up at will, and will remain long after each of us 
has passed through its gears. 
The second lens may be less familiar to readers, but most of you can probably 
intuit that it is of a much different color than the first. In fact, it’s almost at the 
other end of the spectrum. The study of literature for the past three decades has 
increasingly been informed by the postmodern celebration of difference; it is 
very much about the individual. For instance, just consider how literature is never 
experienced exactly the same by two people, or even by the same person twice. 
Read a novel at twelve and forty-two and you’ll know what I mean. 
Postmodernism has taught us that social constructs like race, gender, sexuality, 
and class radically determine how words in a book can be translated into 
radically different meanings, depending on the reader. A poor, lesbian, 
oppressed, African American woman in the rural South, to illustrate, reads a 
much different version of The Color Purple than anyone else. Recognizing the 
inherent differences in meaning that language contains is crucial, in the world 
according to postmodernism, for it exposes “essentialism”—the notion that there 
is an “essentially gay” or “essentially poor” or “essentially Black” identity—as 
an illusion, a social construction. In the same breath that essentialist assumptions 
are exploded in a postmodern analysis, ambiguities, uncertainty, and difference 
become instantly celebrated. All meaning, we come to realize, is provisional, 
tentative. And structures themselves can be called into question for what they say 
about the relationships between those who have the power to establish them and 
those who find themselves subject to—and sometimes subjugated by—them. 
Literature, and its study in the twenty-first century, is about as far removed from 
a discourse of “machinery” as is imaginable.  
Since most of you are likely very familiar with the first lens, I would like to 
get you imagining what it is like to look a little closer through this second, more 
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abstract lens, to show you how it proved beneficial (and at times problematic!) to 
me while I was performing influence activities overseas. So, after providing a 
very quick explanation of influence activities to situate non-military readers, I 
will highlight a few characteristics of the discipline of English Lit that I relied on 
to try to both understand and persuade others in the incredibly complex human 
terrain that is Kandahar, Afghanistan. I will then look at three specific influence 
activities that my team undertook in Kandahar to demonstrate those 
characteristics in action. As you move through the narrative, you may gradually 
conclude, as I have since having returned home, that the coalition’s lingering 
status among Afghans—as one giant cultural outsider—is among the most 
significant obstacles to success in defeating the insurgency. Though not for a lack 
of trying, NATO efforts to understand and change Afghan culture have all but 
proven it to be an impossible nut to crack. Should we have known it from the 
start? I’ll let you decide.  
 
1. To Boldly Influence Where No Man Has . . . 
 
Kinetic solutions are no longer the panacea of warfare. Rather, 
individuals need to view ‘reality’ through the eyes of another 
culture, specifically, the one with which they are interacting, in 
order to adapt their attitudes and behaviours to better influence.
2
 
      —Emily Spencer 
 
It is almost universally agreed, in theory at least, that influence activities are 
central to success in a counterinsurgency (COIN) environment. Although kinetic 
force is sometimes necessary to establish security, the non-kinetic measures will 
sustain it. As the theory in Afghanistan has gone, if coalition forces can provide a 
framework of security robust enough to allow for development and 
reconstruction to occur, we will win the trust of the Afghan people, who will see 
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that their well-being is our foremost concern. Consequently, we will be able to 
encourage them to take the steps needed to shut the insurgency down “from the 
inside out,” so to speak. They will actively resist insurgent intimidation instead of 
staying frightened and passive, and they will no longer turn a blind eye to 
insurgents hiding in their villages but point them out to us for capture or arrest 
(or worse). They will reject insurgent demands for supplies, young men to fight, 
or information regarding coalition force movements and activities. Ideally, they 
may even take the physical risks necessary to remove insurgents themselves. 
Once enough internal momentum is generated, the theory goes, coalition forces 
can hand over the reins to Afghans—particularly to the Afghan National Security 
Forces (ANSF) that we have been training all the while—and call it a day. 
Mission accomplished. 
 
2. The Theory, the theory 
To be sure, there have been many instances of localized success of this 
doctrine throughout the nation over a decade since 9/11—many of you reading 
this will have been a part of those successes—but broadly speaking, theory 
continues to be trumped by the overwhelming reality that we have not 
fundamentally altered Afghanistan in ways that need altering. And nor should we 
have been expected to, of course: not in a decade. Today, and on the widest scale, 
the Afghan public does not trust its government. It does not trust coalition forces. 
It does not trust its own police although the Afghan National Army has made 
good strides to gain confidence. It does not understand this model called 
“democracy” that the West has tried to superimpose on top of millennia of what 
amounts to tribal, anarchic living. Simply put, most Afghans have not seen their 
lives improve in ways promised in 2001, whether in terms of economy, 
development, security, or stability. Most opened their arms to foreign 
intervention after 9/11; most have been disappointed since. No small part of that 
disappointment must fall on their own laps, of course, on their unwillingness or 
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inability to fight for themselves, but we, too, are complicit. We, after all, rolled in 
promising change.  
Despite this rather dire characterization of the current state of affairs, one 
thing is certain: failing to understand and influence Afghans did not happen for a 
lack of effort. Influence activities are designed to prompt people to contemplate 
different ways of thinking, feeling, and behaving, and my team, like so many 
others, tried some conventional and innovative approaches to changing minds. To 
illustrate, some concrete examples of influence activities might include:  
  
 providing disinformation to insurgents for direct tactical combat 
advantages or, more broadly, to cultivate internal dissent and 
diminish morale 
 
 delivering cultural awareness training to friendly forces to minimize 
inadvertent contraventions of cultural decorum 
 
 engaging in a joint civil-military venture to hire villagers to clean out 
culverts or build roads in order to stimulate a local economy:  and to 
minimize the chance that young men will be enticed into joining the 
insurgency 
 
 maneuvering tactical units to make insurgents assume a certain 
routine is being established 
 
 demonstrating religious respect by funding mosque repairs 
 
 adopting a less aggressive body posture when doing foot patrols in a 
village 
 
 using an unmanned drone to drop a bomb on insurgents planting 
IEDs in a road 
 
 talking to farmers about the need to avoid digging in fields near 
roads, especially at night 
 
 explaining to Afghans why we—strange people with strange 
languages and customs from places they’ve likely never heard of—
are in their country in the first place 
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 creating and distributing different forms of media to educate the 
local population about matters of health, development, governance, 
or security 
 
 respecting religious and secular holidays 
 
 engaging in dialogue with legitimate public figures, those exercising 
power behind the scenes, and, if feasible, illegitimate powerbrokers:  
including insurgents themselves 
 
 sniping an enemy from a concealed position 500 meters away 
 
 avoiding driving large military vehicles in congested urban areas 
 
 distributing food or medical supplies to a population affected 
adversely by the conflict going on around them 
 
 separating local insurgents from out-of-area fighters 
 
 shaping the conditions for reconciliation and reintegration of 
insurgents 
 
 establishing “911” tip lines for residents to phone in security 
concerns 
 
 establishing a joint honors and awards program with the ANSF to 
recognize exceptional work 
 
 hiring freelance journalists to write stories about progress   
 
 providing financial and other support to the public media to 
encourage free speech 
 
Though different in many cases, each of these examples points to an activity 
designed to “influence” in its own particular way. I include examples of violence 
in the list to acknowledge that some forms of influence are aggressive and 
violent, or what we often call “kinetic.” We can tend to think that influence by 
default involves some kind of benign urging, but in a combat environment, this is 
not—and cannot realistically always be—the case. Sometimes, sadly, the most 
effective form of influence is fatal. However, my role in Kandahar focused on the 
non-kinetic forms, so I’ll stay in my lane. 
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In Kandahar, we attempted most of the non-kinetic influence activities in this 
list. We performed classical psychological operations functions against 
insurgents, like deception, disinformation, or spreading and countering 
propaganda. Mostly, however, our efforts were domestically focused, as would 
be expected in a COIN environment. We tried to influence a wide range of target 
audiences: not only insurgent but also potential insurgent, the general Afghan 
population, men, women, teenagers, businesspeople, the unemployed, the 
illiterate, the ANSF, what intelligentsia remains, and a host of other demographic 
groupings. We even tried to influence our own forces by providing cultural 
awareness training: identifying and giving specific direction on holidays with 
significant religious and historical import; providing information about important 
figures in Kandahar society; giving direction on how to properly engage with key 
leaders; and telling soldiers what to expect during key public and private Afghan 
social events.  
We also informed and educated Afghans about the steps that their new 
government, GIRoA—the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan—
was trying to take in order to improve their lives (“trying” here is the active 
word). We tried to measure and, in turn, shape public perceptions of the Afghan 
National Army and Afghan National Police by providing information to the 
public about upcoming projects with job opportunities, or scheduling visits of 
mobile medical and veterinary clinics. We funded the acquisition and distribution 
of soccer uniforms for kids, helped the University of Kandahar with printing, 
publishing, and computer costs, and worked behind the scenes to support those 
elements of Afghan society that could help engender the public perception of 
some kind of normalcy of life: the press, media outlets, small businesses, or even 
women’s sewing groups. And more. We tried much, much more. But how did we 
determine how to create the best messages and get them across? 
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3. English Lit:  You’re Kidding, Right?      
 
I asked my Brigade Commanders what was the number one thing they 
would have liked to have had more of, and they all said cultural 
knowledge.
3
 
       —LTG Peter Chiarelli 
 
LTG Chiarelli’s Brigade Commanders in Iraq are articulating a request also 
often heard in Afghanistan, and while having more cultural knowledge would be 
great, the practical constraints of getting it are virtually prohibitive. After all, 
consider what we mean by cultural knowledge. To truly understand a culture—
say the culture of the American South, or California’s wine country, or the 
Midwest, or Northern Canada—would take much more than some classroom 
study or even months of close observation. It would take years of living there, 
learning the nuances, the colloquialisms, and the mannerisms of a variety of 
groups and subgroups. It would take developing an appreciation for local tastes, 
longstanding grievances, and the struggles that people have had to overcome in 
both recent and distant memory. It would require understanding how geography 
and terrain influence perception. In other words, it would take time:  the one 
thing that we’ve never had enough of in Afghanistan. 
So it is that statements like LTG Chiarelli’s must be put in context. What his 
commanders are actually doing is expressing frustration related to feeling the full 
alienating impact of their status as linguistic and cultural outsiders. They know 
they are on deployment for about a year. They know that no matter what kind of 
pre-deployment training they have had, it will be utterly insufficient. They know 
that it will take several months to even start to understand the human and cultural 
terrain of the district they’ve been deployed to. In essence, they know that, 
although their key task is to be able to “read” the environment, in order to predict 
and plan (and to manage and control: two things militaries need to excel at to 
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win) such reading is, in fact, virtually impossible. Catching glimpses and 
fragments of understanding, just as they think they are starting to make sense of 
it all, they redeploy home. The next rotation (or as we often called all of them in 
Kandahar: Roto Zero) will arrive, and the cycle will begin anew. It is not unlike, 
perhaps, the feeling that English professors feel when that new batch of freshmen 
shows up for the first class of composition.  
Fortunately, there is a different kind of “reading,” a cognitive “advance copy” 
if you will, available to develop the basic tools for assessing human and cultural 
terrain; it comes courtesy of—you guessed it—the study of literature. In the same 
way as studying military history prepares infantry and artillery officers to 
anticipate tactical and strategic combat maneuvers, studying literature can 
prepare soldiers to anticipate common human “maneuvers.” Literature exposes 
and analyzes human desires, frustrations, and hopes, and it can train soldiers to 
be on the lookout for a vast range of possible emotional and psychological 
responses to conflict and confrontation. Shy of actually living in a foreign 
environment, imaginatively rehearsing human dynamics in advance can be an 
invaluable preparatory step toward mitigating the sheer cognitive overload that a 
cultural collision produces. My academic background developed all of these 
skills, and so before showing you some of the actual projects where I was able to 
employ them in useful ways, I want to take a minute to look at that background 
in a little more detail.  
But first, a quick defense … My experience has been that no shortage of 
people—military and civilian alike—assume that English majors (and profs) 
often do little but sit around emoting about Wordsworthian Romantic poetry, 
debating the merits of proper grammar, or ruminating over the relative value of 
long-dead authors. Perhaps some of you have even heard it put along these lines: 
“Well, English is ultimately pretty useless. I mean, it doesn’t even pay well. But 
hey: they’re not hurting anyone, and maybe we need that artsy kind of stuff every 
now and then.” Dismissive though this may sound, I have to grant that it is not 
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entirely untrue. For instance, we certainly don’t get paid like corporate execs and, 
no, we don’t hurt anyone (unless lecturing students to death counts).  
Seriously though, we do, of course, accomplish a little more than this 
depiction suggests. Modern literary studies have become richly theoretical over 
the past two decades, both self-generating and incorporating from other 
disciplines an array of critical models which interrogate all types of literary and 
cultural products. Art, of which literature is but a part, has become subjected to 
readings based on gender, class, economics, psychology, environment, 
linguistics, evolution, and more. Key in these assessments is the sheer critical 
acumen that is brought to bear on a text. Literary scholars, and the students we 
teach, have learned to treat writing—fictional, poetic, dramatic, political, 
scientific, or otherwise—with a healthy critical suspicion, if for no other reason 
than we realize the often subtle power that language holds. Our business is to 
assess how words get invested with meaning, how they can appear invisible to 
those who use them, and how they can lead to all sorts of injustices when people 
overlook the fact that language is not merely used to describe the world but a 
tool, a process, and an interaction that in many ways creates the world. 
Language, in other words, is never passive.  
In an online discussion forum response to a student question—“Why do we 
need to learn this? Is my commander going to send me a poem and ask me to 
explicate it?”—one English professor compiled a list of twenty-one reasons why 
people might consider the study of literature as an academic career path.
4
  Before 
adding a few of my own reasons and describing how they were useful in the 
context of Afghanistan, consider four of hers. While you read, I invite you to 
muse over how they might be useful for soldiers battling an insurgency in a 
foreign country: 
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1. To open our minds to ambiguities of meaning. While people will 
"say what they mean and mean what they say" in an ideal world, 
language in our world is, in reality, maddeningly and delightfully 
ambiguous. If you go through life expecting people to play by your 
rules, you'll only be miserable, angry, and disappointed. You won't 
change them. Ambiguity, double entendres, and nuance give our 
language depth and endless possibility. Learn it. Appreciate it. Revel 
in it. 
 
2. To teach us to see individual bias. In a sense, each of us is an 
unreliable or naive narrator, but most of us mindlessly accept the 
stories of certain friends or family without qualification. We should 
remember that they are centers of their own universes, though, just 
like we are. They are first-person narrators—not omniscient—just 
like we are. The only thing that suffers when we appreciate 
individual bias is our own gullibility. 
 
3. To encourage us to question "accepted" knowledge. As children, 
most of us were taught to believe what we're told and those basic 
hypotheses provide our schemas, or building blocks, of knowledge. 
As we grow, we learn to question some ideas while rejecting the 
offensively alien ideas outright, often without real examination. 
However, human progress often results from the rejection of 
assumed "facts." The difficulty lies in spotting our own unexamined 
assumptions. The more ideas we expose ourselves to, the more of our 
own assumptions we can root out to question and either discard or 
ground our lives in. 
 
4. To explore ethical complexities. Only children find ethical rules cut 
and dried. Literature forces readers to challenge their simplistic 
ethical conceptions and sometimes their outright condemnation of 
others' actions. For example, we believe lying is wrong. But what do 
we mean? Do we never lie? Have you ever met a person rude enough 
to follow this rule implicitly? Be advised, though: ethical exploration 
is a mature endeavor; it is not for the thin-skinned. 
 
These are brilliant answers, really, and I couldn’t have written them any better 
myself. I do want to add a few of my own, though, so let’s start by going back to 
my opening statement about how influence activities involve trying to persuade 
people to think and act differently.  
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First, what do we mean by “people”? It should be self-evident enough, right? 
Well, yes and no. To start, by “people” I mean more than just Afghan people. I 
mean humans, and the study of literature lends itself to much more than just 
understanding individual characters in a text and why they do what they do in the 
narrative. It is a guide for understanding humanity itself because studying 
literature is, ultimately, the study of humanity, including the study of what makes 
us humane or not. Like for those of us who study it for a living, literature doesn’t 
just describe but interrogates how and why people think, feel, experience, and 
behave in the wide variety of ways that we do. As I say to those students who 
argue, “Hey, Sir, why can’t we just let this be a story,” authors don’t sit down 
and write for months or years on end “just” to tell a story. They write because 
they have critiques to make about the world they live in, key observations to 
make, judgments to pass, and debates to invoke in the minds of readers. They are 
interested in conscious and subconscious motivations, needs, frustrations, joys, 
and raw complexities. Like the writing of it, the study of literature demands 
critical faculties and nurtures tangible tools to actively engage with, and 
hopefully understand a little better, the human condition.  
“People” also refers to alternative cultures, times, and places. Literature forces 
us to consider similarities and differences, continuities and disjunctions, when we 
confront characters from worlds other than our own, even when those worlds are 
imaginative constructs in some of the far-out reaches of science fiction or fantasy 
or the distant historical past. Most importantly, I believe, it shows us our 
common human qualities. No matter what country or culture you’re reading, 
stories share common themes, and in Afghanistan one striking narrative is that 
parents there, like parents everywhere, want a better life for their children than 
they themselves had. Other common Afghan narratives include family tensions, 
social tensions, and class and economic tensions, in- and out-group dynamics, 
philosophical and religious inquiry, and even investigations into what constitutes 
good art or “beauty.”  
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Great literature throws these subjects out for us to confront, and it rarely 
offers tidy solutions, because life isn’t tidy and neither are we. Literature thus 
also functions to force us to interrogate our own complicity in the untidiness of 
the world around us. In the process of staring at ourselves in the mirror of 
literature, we learn to ask tough questions; we also learn to keep an open mind—
and heart—when looking for answers that are more often than not ridiculously 
complex. In a place like Afghanistan, where it can be tempting to overlook 
diversity and simply view an entire nation as some homogenous Other, because it 
seems to make it easier to make sense of “them,” the consequences of 
overlooking complexity can be disastrous. Anyone who has struggled to piece 
together the myriad of family, clan, and tribal power relationships in a rural 
village, to try to figure out who, exactly, is in charge, will know what I’m talking 
about.  
Perhaps the biggest advantage that a background in literary study gave me in 
Afghanistan was that it encourages thinking in symbolic and metaphoric—that is, 
abstract—terms. All language is symbolic: what are words if not arbitrary 
squiggly symbols clumped together in groups, groups that only mean what they 
do because a critical mass of people all agree that they mean what they do? I tried 
always to remain cognizant of the arbitrary nature of my own language system 
and the unique bias that I and those around me would have because of it. 
Consider the fundamental concepts of time and space and what your Western 
sense of them is. They are completely different when considered from an Afghan 
perspective. Most Kandaharis, for instance, live an isolated, traditional, rural, 
agrarian existence, where time is measured in seasons. It is also measured in very 
short spans—they are more likely to look ahead only a few days or weeks rather 
than months or years—in large part because of thirty years of conflict and the 
scarcity and low life expectancy rates it has generated. Similarly, most do not 
travel much beyond the immediate confines of their village: they simply have had 
no reason to, historically. Consequently, their concept of space, and interest in 
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larger spaces, is extremely limited:  most couldn’t even identify their own nation 
on a map. Even fewer would be able to glean the real meaning of putting a 
satellite in space or a man on the moon.  
Recognizing these fundamental differences in perception forced me to see 
myself as part of one, not a or the, system of meaning, which in turn allowed me 
to challenge existing assumptions that many of my fellow soldiers had about the 
Afghan people: especially about their cultural, religious, and social norms, which 
were often easily dismissed as “backward.” Dominated as Afghanistan is by a 
powerful oral tradition, a host of clan and tribal relationships, and a fusion of 
religious and cultural norms unlike those seen anywhere else in the world, 
walking in prepared to look for how power was rooted in and supported by 
abstract forms of communication was invaluable. War is a serious, literal event. 
Individuals and families literally have their lives disrupted and destroyed. Bodies 
are literally injured, maimed, and rendered useless. People become literally dead. 
However, warfare, and especially insurgency warfare, is loaded with abstraction. 
Consciously or not, people turn to and, in fact, rely on symbols, metaphors, and 
rhetoric to sustain their beliefs. As much as the material, concrete activities going 
on around them, abstract ideas can determine whether people will embrace, 
tolerate, or reject an insurgency. Or us.  
To put this into a more concrete context, consider how, in Afghanistan, 
insurgents rely strongly on the richly symbolic narrative of “repelling foreign 
invaders.” We heard it in almost every piece of their propaganda. Central to this 
meme, this idea that gets transmitted culturally from generation to generation, 
like a gene does biologically, is the idea of the mujahedeen, the “freedom 
fighter” character brought into the popular imagination in the West through 
Sylvester Stallone’s character Rambo in the third installment of the Rambo 
franchise. Although commonly understood in the Western world to have 
originated in the Afghan struggle against Soviet occupation, it actually has much 
deeper, and more powerful, historical roots. “Muhajirs,” or immigrants, formed a 
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crucial part of Mohammed’s initial following.
5
 Today, insurgents invoke the term 
mujahedeen to recruit, to try to shame Afghans who might otherwise resist them 
into silence, and to internally maintain cohesiveness. “Repel foreign invaders and 
you, too, will become a mujahedeen” is a powerful and effective abstraction 
because it taps into a long and proud Afghan history of repelling that has 
gradually become mythologized: “We kicked out Alexander the Great. We 
kicked out the Soviets. And more foreign invaders in between. To be a good and 
honorable Afghan, you must now help us repel these new foreign invaders. Send 
us your young men; if they die, they will be heroes in death.” The degree to 
which people are influenced by abstract ideas such as this can make the 
difference between merely knowing about a cause and supporting it. One of the 
central reasons we are still in Afghanistan over a decade after 9/11, I contest, is 
that we’ve grossly underestimated the grip of such abstraction on the average 
Afghan imagination.  
Imagination. Above all else, studying literature encourages its development, 
the chief benefit of which is that it in turn nurtures empathy: the ability to see, to 
imagine, the world through someone else’s eyes. Reading literature is foremost 
an imaginative enterprise—reading literally creates images in the mind’s eye—
and those who study it develop an elastic imagination, an ability not only to 
probe a little deeper to see what makes humans similar, and different, across time 
and space, but also to react to the ambush of strangeness that is launched when 
we confront a foreign culture. I cannot overstate how seeing, or trying to see, 
through the eyes of another culture, gender, sex, social class, economic condition, 
ethnicity, skin color, or nationality is not merely some leftist utopian quest. In 
war, it has concrete tactical advantages. It allowed me to tailor propaganda. It 
improved how we countered it. It encouraged innovative approaches to problem-
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solving. Above all else, it gave my commander an enhanced ability to do 
something that all commanders need to do: anticipate.  
In summary, the realm of literary study taught me to imagine, forecast, and be 
prepared to negotiate difference. Such negotiation lies at the core of building 
bridges with the Afghan public. It also improves the understanding of 
motivations, whether those of insurgents, of those who knowingly, unwillingly, 
or unwittingly support them, of friendly Afghan security forces, and even of 
coalition troops themselves, who were, after all, serving in Afghanistan in many 
instances not merely because they were ordered to. In a COIN environment, 
understanding—and influencing if necessary—how our own team views the 
conflict and the actual, real people involved in it can determine success or failure.  
 
4. Words Into Deeds 
Demonstrating the practical value of my grounding in literary and cultural 
studies is more important than the words I’ve used to describe it so far. Three 
specific influence activities I designed in Kandahar underscore the practical 
merits of the intellectual skills that training in the discipline develops. I am not 
out on a recruiting campaign here, and there are other ways to access these skills 
than by getting a PhD in English Lit. Where they are not being made available, 
they need to be made so, now. Preparing intelligently for future asymmetric 
conflicts—the kinds of conflicts we will continue to face in the twenty-first 
century—demands that leaders give their soldiers the right tools to do the job.  
 
Pashto Proverb Booklet 
The most “literary” piece of brainstorming I had in Afghanistan was a project 
I developed with my cultural advisors called the Pashto Proverbs Booklet. 
Although only about ten pages long, it included dozens of proverbs that most 
Afghans would easily recognize. The value of the booklet lay not so much in  
what the proverbs said but in their utility as a cultural icebreaker. Afghans would  
consider our attempt to learn and speak their language, and recognize their 
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Figure 1 – Pashto Proverbs Booklet  
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Pashto 
Proverb 
Literal Translation and 
Implied Message 
Phonetic 
Pronunciation 
Occasion for Use 
دکبرکاسه 
 نسکوره ده. 
The bowl of pride always 
ends upside down - If 
someone is too proud or 
arrogant, they will 
become nobody because 
no one is God, no one is 
perfect. Today's rich man 
may be tomorrow's 
poorest man. 
Dah kEEbah 
kAHsa 
naskOOrah 
dah  
Used to warn someone that 
he will end up with 
problems if he continues 
being arrogant. 
خپله ژبه هم 
 کالده هم بال.
Your own tongue can 
bring you a castle or a 
monster - What you say 
and how it's said affect 
your fate, future.  
KhpALa 
zhABha 
humm balAda 
humm 
khAlada 
If questioning someone to 
encourage them to tell the 
truth. Also, to show 
empathy for those who 
have been threatened by 
INS (i.e. the INS tongue is 
"monstrous"). 
خپل عمل د 
 الرې مل .
Your future is determined 
by your actions - You are 
accountable for all of 
your actions, good or bad, 
and you will answer in 
the future for them. 
Khah-phAL-
ahmAl dah 
LAHri mahl 
Multiple possibilities: use 
your imagination. 
د وږي  موړ
له حاله څه 
 خبردی .
A fed person knows 
nothing about the 
situation of the hungry - 
some people who are well 
fed (i.e. wealthy) care 
little about the poor and 
needy.  
Morh 
dhawAjay 
pahal sah-
khabAR day 
To evoke charity and 
cooperation and to remind 
those with power of the 
social responsibility they 
have to their villages for 
security and prosperity. To 
gain a second-order effect, 
stress that you recognize 
that we come from a land 
that has much, and we in 
fact left that land to come 
here to help bring peace 
and prosperity to Afghans. 
Why? Because we are 
proud to help. 
کوږ بار تر 
منزله نه 
 رسېږي. 
A tilted load will never 
reach its destination - 1. 
dishonesty is eventually 
uncovered, and when you 
are caught, you can never 
be trusted again. 2. 
something off-balance 
will tip over and never 
reach its destination (i.e. 
tilted saddlebags falling 
off a horse) 
Kuzh bahr 
tahr-
manzALa na-
rrha-SEE jhee 
Often used in this context:  
a person you suspect of 
being dishonest says 
something. You warn him 
about the importance of 
being honest. He sticks to 
his story but is later caught 
in his lie, revealing his 
dishonesty. Saying this is 
like saying "I told you so." 
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traditions, as a gesture of respect, a move on our part to say that we recognized 
and understood that we were outsiders in their homeland. We hoped that Afghans 
would reciprocate with their own offerings of respect and understanding, in the 
process taking a small step forward on the fragile bridge of trust.  
The booklet broke the proverbs down by category. As you can see from 
Figure 1, these particular proverbs are from a category on anti-corruption. Anti-
corruption is a sore spot with many Afghans, some of whom even see coalition 
efforts over the past decade as merely the propping up of a political regime in 
Kabul that is corrupt, inefficient, and illegitimate. Sharing kernels of wisdom 
such as these proverbs contain, even in badly spoken Pashto, struck me as a 
useful way to broach a sensitive subject like anti-corruption with the local 
population. Other categories in the booklet contained proverbs thematically 
focusing on anti-narcotics, ANA and ANP roles and capabilities, governance, 
accountability, the insurgent use of children as IED emplacers and early warning 
systems, education, sanitation, and health. We printed a few thousand of these 
booklets and disseminated them among the entire Task Force.  
I knew full well that some would get tossed in the trash as irrelevant, that they 
might be mocked by subordinate units who saw anything coming out of the Task 
Force Headquarters as disconnected from “ground truth,” and that others might 
even get torn to shreds by soldiers bearing (often legitimate) individual 
grievances against Afghans. Some, we hoped, would get used by those troops 
willing, and not ordered—you can’t order someone to be genuine—to take the 
small risk of setting their egos aside to risk extending an open palm in a foreign 
tongue. On the whole, we weren’t disappointed.  
 
Afghan Holiday Strategy 
Given the distinctive fusion of Pashtunwali, Islamic history, and attempted 
military conquest by outsiders that defines Kandahar, the first thing that struck 
me upon arriving was that nobody had taken the time to extensively assess and 
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inform our own forces about how Kandaharis celebrate and commemorate their 
traditions. Coalition forces had been in the country long enough to know that the 
tempo of operations slows down annually during Ramadan, and I myself had 
maybe 30 minutes of pre-deployment training that was devoted to understanding 
the general significance of Ramadan to Muslims. But that was about it. To me, 
and certainly to my Afghan cultural advisors, who I didn’t actually meet until I 
was on the ground in Afghanistan, this represented a fundamental ignorance of 
the value of belief systems to Afghans, and especially of the power of 
symbolism, metaphor, and rhetoric that underlies them. 
 
Figure 2 – Sample Page from Afghan Holiday Strategy Calendar 
 
To remedy this cultural black hole, I tasked my staff to sit down with our 
cultural advisors and identify every holiday—Islamic or secular, modern or 
traditional, big or small—in the Afghan calendar. From here, we then prepared 
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and released, well in advance, extensive directives to all members of the Task 
Force. These directives informed them of a holiday’s historical significance, and 
they gave specific directions on the anticipated movements of people (i.e. to 
shrines or monuments), potential security threats (i.e. insurgents target public 
gatherings for a mass propaganda effect), and the actions that we expected the 
Task Force to take, if any. Afghans are a proud people. They value custom and 
decorum—and especially public expressions of it. So, depending on the 
importance of the holiday to Afghans, we would arrange for our senior leaders to 
release public messages of congratulations and meet with, host dinners for, and 
even provide gifts to their Afghan military, political, and civil allies.  
For the Persian New Year, Nawruz, we developed a plan to have the ANSF 
deliver humanitarian aid to the poorest of the poor. It was part of my strategy to 
get the ANSF thinking about how to coordinate with political leaders, incorporate 
media coverage into their actions, and create an atmosphere of trust with their 
own people. Afghans have had notoriously bad experiences with the ANSF, 
particularly the police, and this was a chance to make good. In fact, the ANSF 
were actually my primary target audience. Since I knew that the Afghan public 
would surmise that NATO was behind the operation (Afghans know that their 
own government has neither the funding nor the organizational will to pull 
something like this off independently), two second-order effects I hoped for 
were, first, to have Afghans see coalition forces as respecting one of their most 
cherished traditions, and second, to see us and their own security forces offering 
them a tangible glimpse of normalcy in the face of thirty years of conflict.  
OPERATION NAWRUZ, the first ever influence-led operation in Kandahar, 
was tremendously successful. At the end of the two-day operation, the ANSF had 
provided enough food for 15,000 people for a month, had worked with local 
political and religious leaders, and had gained positive media coverage as far 
away as Kabul. As for whether we achieved the second-order effects, I have no 
clue. One of the central problems in performing influence activities in a place  
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Figure 3 - Operation NAWRUZ  
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like Afghanistan is that it is almost impossible to tell whether what you have 
done will have effected permanent change in someone’s mind. Minds are so 
ephemeral, nuanced, and influenced by other variables that they are impossible to 
quantify. So goes the nature of counterinsurgency. 
 
Figure 4 - OPERATION NAWRUZ (Translated into Pashto for the ANSF) 
 
Media Operations 
When I arrived in Kandahar in November 2009, I inherited a media operations 
program that had been in place since about 2007, when Canadian forces started 
building up in the province. It was being run by PSYOPS personnel, and they 
employed conventional means to deliver fairly conventional messages. Through a 
series of contracts with local radio stations in Kandahar City, they ran generic 
“White” advertisements (“White” means completely truthful—Canadian COIN 
doctrine prohibits performing Black or Grey PSYOPS on civilians) designed to 
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promote the Afghan National Army (ANA) as the “proud warriors” or “true 
defenders” of Afghanistan, support Afghan National Police (ANP) recruiting 
efforts and, most often, simply relay messages of public interest. Such messages 
might include the location and timing of an upcoming mobile medical or 
veterinary clinic, the opening of a government office, advice on sound sanitation 
practices, how to report a discovered IED or suspicious person, or the planning 
and completion of reconstruction and development projects being done jointly by 
coalition and Afghan engineers. All of these messages were created in the name 
of sharing useful information, protecting the public, and demonstrating our 
concern for their well-being. Selling ourselves was never our main effort because 
we knew that actions on the ground, and not words, mattered more in that 
respect.  
As readers having served in Iraq or Afghanistan will know, however, this is 
all well and fine until we consider the most important target audience of all: rural 
people living well beyond the airwaves of a major center. They are most strongly 
subjected to insurgent propaganda and recruiting and more likely than urbanites 
to support the insurgency. American and British PSYOPS teams have a good 
history of responding to media coverage gaps like this by setting up “Radio-in-a-
Box” (RIAB) local radio stations in rural areas (we Canucks had never done it 
before, to my knowledge, certainly not in Kandahar). Staffed and run by a 
combination of coalition forces and coalition-friendly locals, RIABs have the 
ability to shape the nature of the messages that Afghans are receiving. This is 
important not only for countering insurgent propaganda, but also for just airing 
information of interest to rural audiences. The obvious disadvantage is that those 
audiences immediately know that “we” —foreign military forces—are running 
the radio stations, so they treat what they hear with varying degrees of cynicism 
and distrust.  
My background proved useful in offsetting this distrust. For our RIAB in 
Panjway’I District I, the birthplace of the Taliban and one of the toughest places 
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in the country to discern, let alone change, what is going on in Afghan minds, we 
needed some inventive programming. We started by broadcasting only traditional 
Pashto music. Panjway’I is ultra-conservative, and people do not want to hear 
Bollywood, or as one caller told the DJ, “that demon Pink.” We also set up a 
“contest hotline” (just a cell phone, of course) where listeners could phone in, 
answer a simple question, and win free cell phone minutes. We offered public 
service announcements, like those that would be heard in the city, but we tailored 
them to meet rural agrarian interests: the scheduled deliveries of wheat seed; the 
start of a project to clear culverts that would pay young Afghan men; or advance 
warnings that our engineers were about to blow up discovered IED caches, for 
instance. We also used it as a venue for the only face of the official Afghan 
government present in the district on a regular basis, the District Leader, to 
occasionally address residents.    
The station slowly gained traction with listeners. It was good, but it occurred 
to me that it needed an even more intense local flavor to encourage listenership. 
Part of my academic interest in oral-dominant cultures reminded me that tribal 
peoples simply love a good story. Anyone who has been to Iraq or Afghanistan, 
where indigenous populations still exist in relatively traditional modes of living, 
will likely have first-hand experience in this cultural uniqueness. Afghans are an 
oral people. They have an estimated 25% literacy rate. They can sit around and 
talk, or listen, for hours on end, and in ways that would drive most Westerners 
mad. I have first-hand experience with this in the classroom, where I teach First 
Nations’ literature and culture. Storytelling is circular, not linear. It is usually not 
plot or character-driven but richly descriptive. It often has its “key theme” buried 
deeply underneath layers of narrative, demanding multiple reads to get “the 
point”—if in fact there is one. It can drive students who expect a linear, “logical” 
narrative model a little bonkers; anyone having been invited to sit in on an 
Afghan shura will have felt something similar.  
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One way of tapping into this Afghan love of story, it seemed to me, would be 
to actually have them tell each other their own stories: on the air. The idea was 
risky, because it would involve sending an outsider, our DJ, out to interview and 
tape locals, who are suspicious of all outsiders. He was willing to take the risk. 
To get the idea off the ground, my cultural advisors—who were never out of 
arm’s reach during my entire tour—and I created an interview matrix, which we 
updated weekly. It included some longer term projects designed to educate the 
people of Panjway’I as well, to get them thinking about the bigger world around 
them (in hindsight, a woefully optimistic aspiration):   
 
Figure 5 - RIAB Programming Framework 
Examples of Routine Interview 
Topics 
 
Special Projects:  
Socio-Cultural Specials  
(30-90 min specials on one of the 
following subjects; will bring in experts 
where required) 
 
 
Entertainment 
- interview listeners to talk about 
radio programming 
- interview listeners to talk about 
games people play (kites, marbles, 
cards) 
- get them to talk about the role of 
poetry & storytelling in Panjway’I 
 
- Role of Public Memory 
- Global Islam 
- Tribal History in Canada and the USA 
 
 
Business and Industry 
- interview business owners 
- get one to explain the process for 
licensing 
- get one to explain trade routes & 
nearby markets 
- allow people to express concerns 
about transportation 
- Afghan Life “Then and Now” (Under 
the Soviets & Taliban vs. life today) 
- Afghan Cultural Diversity 
- Rural vs. Urban Living 
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Education 
- interview teacher 
- describe school system, university 
and tech college 
- interview a mullah about role of 
informal education 
- interview leaders to get them to 
discuss importance of education 
 
- Food Culture 
- The Role of Clothing and Adornment 
- The Meaning of Music 
- Home Remedies 
 
 
Because of rural Afghanistan’s strong family, tribal, and clan bonds, it is not 
uncommon for people from one village to spend most of their lives never coming 
into contact with those from a village down the road. Interviews like these 
allowed us to capture local stories which, in the very act of public sharing and 
airing, we hoped would engender a broader sense of community and belonging. 
Afghans were looking for propaganda; instead, we gave them a venue to talk to 
each other, a chance to “virtually” meet their neighbors and, perhaps for the first 
time, begin imagining themselves as part of something bigger. As with so many 
of the influence projects we started in Kandahar, I was gone long before having 
had a chance to see how successful the entire undertaking turned out to be. If the 
death threats the DJ received from insurgents as I was preparing to leave 
Kandahar were any indication, then we must have been doing something right. 
War is absurd. 
 
5. Conclusion? 
As U.S. and NATO forces stand poised to begin a massive withdrawal of 
combat troops, the long debate has already begun over how best to characterize 
the last eleven years. Have the sacrifices been worth it? Is Afghanistan another 
Vietnam? Did we achieve any meaningful success at all? I’ll leave these 
questions for political pundits, military historians, and online bloggers to have a 
field day with. For me, the questions that linger, even today, are more direct: Did 
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I succeed in encouraging our forces to take strides to better understand the 
Afghan people? Did I successfully influence at least some Afghans to take up 
their own cause? Did I convince even one insurgent to lay down his arms and 
peacefully rejoin his community? How out of touch was I with “ground truth” in 
devising some of my projects? Was what I tried worth it?  
When I imagine Afghanistan, looking into my own mind’s eye to focus on my 
deployment, I can say with confidence that yes, at least for a while, some 
people’s lives were better as a result of my being there. I like to think that I am 
not alone, that there are many others out there who feel that they made small 
differences in the lives of some, for a while, and often by using their own 
specialized skills and experiences. Their stories and histories are fully beginning 
to flow now. I, for one, anticipate the plunge into what promises to be a deep 
river and my hope is that this particular stream about non-kinetic influence might 
feed in meaningful ways into that river. There is a public consciousness in North 
America still struggling to come to terms with what this conflict has meant, and 
part of helping the public may be to remind them that, like a literary text, 
Afghanistan “means” differently for every individual soldier who has 
experienced it. Like them, many of us have “read” this war, sometimes with 
pride, occasionally with horror, and often with no small degree of ambivalence.  
As of yet, Afghanistan is a tale without a climax. Could it also be one without 
a conclusion?  
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